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Abstract
Surveys provide crucial information about the social consequences of armed conflict, but armed
conflict can shape surveys in ways that limit their value. We use longitudinal survey data from
throughout the recent armed conflict in Nepal to investigate the relationship between armed
conflict events and survey response. The Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS) provides a rare
window into survey data collection through intense armed conflict. The CVFS data reveal that
with operational strategies tailored to the specific conflict, duration of the panel study is the main
determinant of attrition from the study, just as in most longitudinal studies outside of conflict
settings. Though minor relative to duration, different dimensions of armed conflict can affect
survey response in opposing directions, with bombings in the local area reducing response rates
but nationwide political events increasing response rates. This important finding demonstrates that
survey data quality may be affected differently by various dimensions of armed conflict. Overall,
CVFS response rates remained exceptionally high throughout the conflict. We use the CVFS
experience to identify principles likely to produce higher quality surveys during periods of
generalized violence and instability.
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1. Introduction
Survey methods provide basic tools for gathering information about the human population.
This information is a key source for understanding human populations and how they change
and for designing policies and programs aimed at serving human populations. Because of
this, collecting survey data during periods of dramatic social change, such as armed conflict,
is often desirable. Such information regarding a population in conflict can serve to improve
our understanding of the experiences and behavior of human populations and our
understanding of programs designed to serve the needs of those in conflict. Unfortunately,
conflict can pose a substantial obstacle to the collection of survey data and much of the
research on conflict-affected populations is qualitative in nature, based on non-
representative samples, or is limited by high levels of non-responses (Mneimneh et al.
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2008). In this paper we examine the influence of armed conflict on survey non-response as a
dimension of total survey error and document survey methods designed to overcome these
obstacles and provide reliable measures from populations experiencing armed conflict.
The quality and reliability of surveys undertaken in conflict zones is a topic of substantial
controversy. In 2002, Barakat et al. argued that scientific sampling (and thus a representative
population sample) is usually not possible in conflict situations and that structured
interviews might be an inappropriate means for collecting information. Concerns over data
quality produce controversy regarding the basic facts surrounding armed conflict. For
example, efforts to estimate the number of violent deaths during the US led invasion of Iraq
vary from around 43,000 (Iraq Body Count 2011) to 654,965 (Burnham et al. 2006).
Although the Burnham et al. (2006) study published in The Lancet used a household-based
survey, the methods they used to obtain their unusually high estimate were subsequently
widely criticized (Bohannon 2006; Johnson et al. 2008; Marker 2008). A similar whirlwind
broke out around the International Rescue Committee's estimates of “excess deaths” of up to
5.4 million based on sample surveys in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Human
Security Report and Macro International found “excess deaths” to be radically lower, less
than one half the IRC estimate (Coghlan et al. 2006; Coghlan et al. 2008; Human Security
Report Project 2011; Macro International Inc. 2008. These contentious examples highlight
the persistent concerns about whether it is possible to collect high quality and representative
survey data during armed conflict (Spagat et al. 2009). Drawing from the Iraq and
Democratic Republic of Congo survey problems, Marker (2008) suggests key sampling and
surveying procedures that can be adapted in conflict situations to address some of the
concerns with estimation. Still, it is ironic that little analytical attention has been devoted to
understanding the influence of conflict on data quality and to design further strategies to
address the challenges faced during data collection.
Of course there are many different dimension of survey data quality. The total survey error
perspective identifies both sampling and non-sampling errors as important for total survey
quality, where non-sampling errors include measurement errors due to the respondent, the
interviewer and the questionnaire (Groves 1987; Groves et al. 2004). Though all the many
different dimensions of survey data quality shape the value of the measures derived from
surveys, many survey data users focus on survey response rates as an overall indicator of the
quality of the survey. In so far as obtaining high response rates requires high effort (Groves
and Couper 1998) and in general higher effort is required to produce higher quality survey
data (Groves 1989), response rates may provide an overall indication of survey data quality.
However, careful study clearly reveals that non-response bias varies greatly across measures
within a single survey, rendering the overall survey response rate a poor indicator of the
level of response bias in any particular measure (Groves 2006; Groves and Peytcheva 2008).
Response rates are only one dimension of overall survey quality and the consequences of
response rates for the quality of any specific measure are likely to vary. Nevertheless,
because the literature on data collection during conflict repeatedly points to non-response as
a crucial threat to reliability and validity of survey based measures, we focus on this
dimension of survey quality. Comparison of response rates over time as armed conflict
unfolds provides an important window into the relationship between armed conflict events
and this dimension of survey quality.
In this article, we investigate response rates and data collection methods during armed
conflict using the Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS), a large scale longitudinal study
that was conducted before, during, and after the recent decade long armed conflict in Nepal.
In the context of an on-going panel study, we argue that careful application of survey
operations best-practices and management of the conflict situation make it possible for
survey researchers to continue to collect reliable information from representative samples of
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conflict-affected populations. Conclusions about data quality and collection methods could
also be relevant for new studies that begin during conflict periods.
We treat non-response and its components (refusals and non-contacts) as a summary
indicator of survey quality, but explicitly recognize both the limits of this approach and
other important dimensions of survey quality. By linking together newly constructed
measures of specific conflict related events (such as bombings and political events) with
measures of survey response (household- and individual-level response, refusal, and non-
contact rates), we evaluate the magnitude of effects of specific types of conflict events on
survey response. As with all longitudinal panel studies the duration of the panel study is a
fundamental driver of continued participation and therefore response rates. But within this
context we are able to use these uncommon measures of conflict related events to estimate
their independent influence on participation in the study. This empirical analysis provides a
unique window into survey data collection during dramatic armed conflict.
Because the CVFS was able to maintain exceptionally high response rates through out the
Nepalese conflict, and render duration of the panel study a much more important
determinant of participation than events related to the conflict, we also document the
operational strategies that can be used to reduce the consequences of armed conflict on
survey data collection and protect the safety of respondents and interviewers. These
strategies include absolute political neutrality of the research staff, direct interaction with
political leaders or warring parties on all sides of the conflict, highly transparent procedures
for the protection of human subjects from disclosure risks, and tailoring of contact
procedures and protocols to changing respondent and interviewer circumstances. Using
evidence from Nepal, we show that the application of these strategies to field operations can
minimize the consequences of violent armed conflict on the quality of survey data collected
during such periods of time.
2. The Setting, the Study, and the Conflict
Our investigation focuses on survey data collected as part of the Chitwan Valley Family
Study (CVFS). The Chitwan Valley lies in south central Nepal and was opened for
settlement in 1955. New settlers represented a wide range of ethnic groups from the hills and
mountains, turning once an isolated “death valley” into a “melting pot” creating substantial
ethnic diversity in Chitwan (Gunaratne 1996; Müller-Böker 2000). The construction of two
major all-weather roads in the late 1970s linked Chitwan's largest town, Narayanghat, to the
capital city Kathmandu and the cities in Eastern Nepal and Northern Indian. This change
turned the once the isolated valley into the transportation hub of the country, dramatically
changing the lives of local people in the decades from 1980 onward (Axinn and Yabiku
2001). The area remains primarily agricultural and poor.
In 1996 the CVFS selected a systematic probability sample of 151 neighborhoods in
Western Chitwan (Barber et al.1997). The CVFS defined a neighborhood as a geographic
cluster of five to fifteen households. Once a neighborhood was selected, all the households
and individuals aged 15 to 59 residing in the sampled neighborhood were interviewed. If any
of these study respondents had a spouse living elsewhere, that spouse was interviewed as
well. In 1996, a total of 4632 individuals were interviewed from those 151 neighborhoods
with a 97 percent response rate.
In 1997, the CVFS launched a Monthly Demographic Event Registry to track the individuals
and their households over time and collect survey data on marriage, childbearing, migration,
and mortality in their households. This demographic event registry forms the backbone of
the CVFS prospective panel study. Beginning in February of 1997, interviewers visited each
household monthly to monitor births, deaths, marriages, divorces, contraceptive use,
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pregnancies, and changes in living arrangements. This monthly data collection has continued
from 1997 until the present. The monthly household visit included an interview with one
household member who reported on all changes in the household and a separate individual
interview with each household member age 18 and older about their contraceptive use. The
interviewing is conducted by the same interviewers and supervisors who collected the
original individual interviews (including life histories), so they are familiar to the
respondents.
The demographic event registry is conducted with high attention to quality assurance
procedures. Over the first year, the CVFS maintained a response rate of 100% for the
household interviews and 99.5% for the individual interviews on contraceptive use. Of
course, as typical in any long-term longitudinal study, attrition has increased and response
rates have declined over time (Groves and Couper 1998). The ongoing armed conflict during
the period of data collection was likely an important contributing factor to this attrition.
However, even during the armed conflict, the CVFS household registry and individual
contraceptive use surveys were able to maintain contact with a large fraction of the original
households and respondents and response rates remained quite high, even after fourteen
years.
1.1 Armed Conflict in Chitwan Valley
Chitwan's population is highly heterogeneous, ethnically diverse, and politically active.
Chitwan has been at the forefront of almost all of the national-level political movements as
well as the recent armed conflict between the Government of Nepal and the Communist
Party of Nepal Maoist.1 The Maoists adopted Mao Tse-tung's strategy of recruiting the most
oppressed groups of people (generally the rural poor) for their militant forces and turning
most rural areas into their base areas for operations. They initially confined their activities to
the most remote areas of the Far Western region of the country and, aside from the first
wave of arrests, Chitwan remained relatively unaffected for several years. As time passed,
the Maoists gained strength and the conflict spread across all parts of the country. By 2000
there were clear signs of the conflict in the Chitwan Valley, the setting for this paper. There,
violence increased from 2000-2005 and ended in 2006. Bombs blasts were common
throughout this period and there were periodic major gun battles in the area. In addition to
the 224 conflict-related fatalities in Chitwan during 2000-2006 (Informal Sector Service
Center 2006), civilians experienced 809 tortures and arrests without warrant, 358 beatings,
and house raids, varying forms of intimidation, forced conscription, billeting, extortion,
curfews, travel restrictions, and general strikes (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2006; Hutt
2004; Pettigrew 2004; Pettigrew and Adhikari 2009). Thus, although Chitwan was not in the
most contested area of the far west, from 2000 there were continuous threats of violence and
the lives of civilians were heavily affected on a daily basis.
3. Linking the Conflict to Response Rates
The violent conflict in the CVFS study area could have disrupted survey operations and
increased non-response through many different potential mechanisms. In a longitudinal
panel study, three factors shape non-response: (1) respondents’ refusals to participate, (2)
non-contact, or difficulty locating respondents, and (3) death of respondents (Groves and
Couper 1998). Fortunately, in the case of Chitwan, there were relatively few conflict-related
deaths and this was not a significant factor in non-response to the surveys. Although one
might imagine that conflict events increase both difficulty locating respondents and refusals
to participate, there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that different types
1Hereinafter we refer to the Community Party of Nepal (Maoist) by the most commonly used name, “the Maoists.”
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of conflict-related events and the geographic location of these events may have different
consequences for contacting and interviewing respondents. These differences come from
differential relationships between specific conflict events and migration, local mobility, and
anxiety and perceptions of threat.
With regard to migration, recent empirical work with the CVFS data from Nepal
demonstrates a clear difference between specific violent and political events. Evidence
shows that while violent events in the local area increased international migration, political
events associated with the conflict decreased international migration (Williams et al.
forthcoming). This is likely because political events are destabilizing and cause a sense of
chaos throughout the country, making people less likely to undertake a migration which is
also a destabilizing behavior. The geographic location of these events could also have
important, and opposing, effects on internal migration. Events such as bomb blasts in the
local area could increase international and internal migration by making the local area a
more dangerous place to live. Alternately, events that affect the whole country and are
concentrated in the capital Kathmandu, such as a State of Emergency or large protests,
might decrease internal migration through making the whole country a dangerous place to
travel and resettle.
Because out-migration is a key cause of inability to locate respondents and along with
refusals is a component of attrition from the longitudinal study, we predict these different
dimensions of conflict will also be related to survey non-response. We hypothesize that
bomb blasts in the local area will increase out-migration and therefore decrease contact
rates, on average, in both the household and the individual longitudinal surveys. Nationwide
political events, on the other hand, will decrease internal migration and increase contact
rates.
Alternately, refusals to participate in the survey will be largely driven by fear, perceptions of
threat, and anxiety about the possible consequences of survey participation. Because the
conflict was publicized by the Maoists as a class struggle between those who “have” and
those who “do not have”, ordinary people were often caught in the middle of the two
warring parties, creating great anxieties and perceptions of threat for both the poor and the
more well-off. Both groups were at risk of suspicion of being a member, supporter, or spy
for one or the other warring party and were often severely punished as a result. These
punishments included extortion, abduction, arrest, beating, and or assassination.
Furthermore, the Maoist militants, who claimed they were the “People's Army” usually
moved in groups and forced ordinary people to provide shelter and food. The possibility of
being forced to billet the Maoist forces induced fear throughout the population. In addition,
the day after a household billeted Maoist forces, the government security forces often came
and raided the house for providing shelter and food to the Maoist militia, creating even
greater fear. As a result, once very welcoming households become very suspicious about
even opening their doors to anyone, about the information that a study might collect, and
whether the study staff would share the information they had collected (such as the number
of new members in the household) with the government security forces so that they could
track Maoist penetration or movement in the area.
The consequences of different conflict events on fear, perceptions of risk, and ultimately on
refusals to participate in the survey are more difficult to predict because we have no direct
empirical evidence on this phenomena. The mere presence of violence in the local area may
tend to make respondents less likely to open their doors and less likely to invite an
interviewer inside to participate in the survey, thereby increasing refusals. If this is true, then
bomb blasts in the local area will increase refusals. With regard to nationwide political
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events, these events will also increase refusals, but to a smaller extent then violent events in
the local area.
Finally, there is also good reason to expect the effects of conflict-related events on
household-level and individual-level non-response to be somewhat different. This is because
the CVFS household-level survey allows both multiple informants and change over time in
informants, so that individual-level feelings of anxiety and threat are less likely to affect
non-response to the household survey. In other words, if one individual in a family does not
want to respond to the household survey, another family member can still do so on behalf of
the family. Individual responses to the violent events, however, are likely to have a stronger
influence on the individual survey non-response. Thus, conflict-related events will likely
produce larger variations in monthly rates of non-response in the CVFS individual-level
contraceptive use survey than in the household survey.
4. Empirical Evidence from the Chitwan Valley Family Study
The combination of monthly response rate measures from the CVFS for both household- and
individual-level instruments and monthly measures of conflict-related events, in both the
study site and nationwide, allow us to explore the empirical relationship between the two. In
this section, we first describe the data and methods employed. Then we examine changes
over time in the response rates of households and individuals in the CVFS. We then describe
changes over time in the individual non-contact and refusal rates. Next, we proceed to
results of the regression models and the specific influences of conflict-related events on
individual response, non-contact, and refusal rates.
4.1 Data
Data for this study come from two sources: response rates data from the CVFS and conflict
event records from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) and other news and institutional
sources.
4.1.1 Measures of Survey Response—Measures of response rates come from two data
sets collected by the Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS) since 1997: the Prospective
Monthly Demographic Household Registry (household-level response rates) and the
Prospective Monthly Contractive Use Survey (individual-level response rates).
Beginning in February of 1997, interviewers visited each household monthly to update
demographic events such as births, deaths, marriages, divorces, contraceptive use,
pregnancies, and changes in living arrangements. The 151 neighborhoods include 1,580
households and 4,632 individuals interviewed as part of the original study. All residents of
these 1,580 households have been followed over time, including households and individuals
from those households who have moved out of the study area. This means that the
prospective panel data are maintained for all those who were interviewed in the original
study, regardless of their migration behavior.
During the monthly household visit, interviewers interview one household member who is
capable of reporting on all changes in the household. Of course these household informants
may not be fully aware of other household members’ contraceptive use, and may misreport
it as a result. Thus, to improve accuracy and safeguard confidentiality, the CVFS
individually interviews each household member age 18 and older about their contraceptive
use. For this study, we use 126 months of response rate data from the prospective monthly
household registry and the contraceptive use survey, covering the period from February
1997 through July 2007.
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4.1.2 Measures of Response Rates—Our measure of the response rate to the
household registry is the percent of completed household interviews each month. The
percent of completed interviews, the household response rate, is calculated by dividing the
total number of completed household interviews by the total eligible2 households and
multiplying by one hundred. Our measure of the individual response rate is the percent of
completed individual interviews. The percent of completed interviews, the individual
response rate, is calculated by dividing the total number of completed individual interviews
by the total eligible individuals for the contraceptive use survey and multiplying by one
hundred.3
4.1.3 Measures of Refusal Rates—To measure refusal rates, we used the percent of
respondents who refused to participate in the contraceptive use interview. The refusal rate is
calculated by dividing the number of respondents who refused to participate in the
contraceptive use interview by the total number of eligible respondents and multiplying by
one hundred.
4.1.4 Measures of Non-contact Rates—To measure non-contact rates, we used the
percent of respondents both within and outside of Nepal who could not be contacted after
three attempts for an individual interview. This measure is calculated by dividing the total
number of respondents who could not be contacted by the total number of eligible
respondents (respondents residing within or outside Nepal) and multiplying by one hundred.
4.1.5 Measure of Duration—In the context of a longitudinal study like the CVFS,
response rates, refusal rates, and non-contact rates are all known to vary systematically with
the duration of the study (Groves and Couper 1998). In order to control for these duration
effects in multivariate models, we constructed a single continuous measure of years since
the study started. This duration measure is coded ‘0’ in 1997, ‘1’ in 1998, ‘2’ in 1999, etc.
This measure is then used as a control variable in our multivariate models.
4.1.6 Measures of Conflict Events—The South Asia Terrorism Portal (www.satp.org),
our source for records of violent events, is an India-based NGO that compiles records of all
violent events in Nepal and other South Asian countries. Records include the date, place,
and number of people affected (injured or killed) by each bomb blast. Measures of political
events are compiled from information collected from major English and Nepali news media,
situation reports of non-governmental organizations in Nepal such as the Informal Sector
Service Center and the United Nations Nepal Information Platform.
Because armed conflicts are not single homogenous events or periods, quantitative
measurement of a conflict is a complex task. This is especially the case for analyses of
civilian responses to violence, where conflict must be measured from a civilian perspective
instead of a macro-level policy or political science perspective. Instead of a single
2Because international out-migration was not common at the beginning of the registry system and tracking households and individuals
around the world was not only difficult but also extremely expensive, we did not attempt to track international moves. For example
during the 126 months of data collection period, only seven households who were interviewed in 1996 moved outside of the country
and did not return. Therefore, households who moved outside of Nepal were treated as ineligible for data collection during the period
they were outside of Nepal. Nevertheless, if the household later returned to Nepal, we collected data retrospectively for the period they
were outside of Nepal. Likewise households within Nepal who could not be located for some extended period but were later found
were also interviewed for all the prior months.
3Individuals who moved out of the study area, either within or outside of Nepal, are considered eligible respondents in this study. The
study tracked and interviewed respondents who moved domestically. However, the study did not attempt to track individual migrants
who had moved outside the country. By the end of the 126 months of data collection, a high of 125 respondents had moved
internationally, a small percentage of the total eligible population. Thus, including these individuals as eligible respondents had little
effect on response and non-contact rates. Nonetheless, we also tested all models using an alternate definition of eligibility, where
international migrants are not eligible. The results of these tests are almost identical to the models we present here.
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homogenous time period, conflicts are comprised of a series of discrete violent and political
events that must be measured carefully. These might include gun battles, bomb blasts,
abductions, kidnappings, house raids, ceasefires, states of emergency, or major
demonstrations. Furthermore, these different types of events can mean different things to
civilians, based on the level of violence, predictability, and frequency of each event and
whether they usually occur in public or private areas (Williams et al. 2010). Thus different
kinds of events can have varying, or even opposing, effects on behaviors such as migration
(Williams et al. forthcoming; Williams and Pradhan 2009). As such, creating scales or
indexes by adding up conflict events is not necessarily appropriate. However, individual
types of events might be strongly correlated, creating problems when including measures of
multiple events in one model.
To address these concerns, we use one measure of a specific kind of violent event in the
local area—bomb blasts—and one measure of nationwide political events. We use bomb
blasts in this analysis because these events were relatively frequent, and because they were
public events that were generally recorded on a more consistent basis than abductions,
kidnappings, and house raids. Our measure of bomb blasts is the number of bomb blasts per
month in Chitwan and the six neighboring districts (Nawalparasi, Tanahu, Gorkha, Dhading,
Makwanpur, and Parsa). Districts in Nepal are quite small, thus the combined area of these
seven districts is approximately half the size of Belgium. To create this measure, we use
records of bomb blasts from SATP. The data cover 67 months, from January 2002 through
July 2007. For the time period that these data do not cover, from February 1997 until
December 2001, we impute the number of bomb blasts to be zero. News reports and
research indicate that the conflict was at a very low intensity (Hutt 2004) during this time
and CVFS research staff members who are resident in the area indicate that there were very
few of these violent events before 2002. Figure 1 shows the number of bomb blasts per
month throughout the study period. As you can see, from mid-2003 bomb blasts occurred
routinely, almost every month until 2005. Of the 67 months of data about bomb blasts, there
were 27 months in which there was at least one bomb blast. The largest number of bomb
blasts in any one month was 12, in July 2004.
Our measure of political events is the number of major political events per month. This
includes states of emergency, major strikes and protests, and major changes in government
that threatened the stability or basic functionality of the central government. A ‘state of
emergency’ is any period when the government officially proclaimed a state of emergency,
which included proclaiming martial law, limiting constitutional rights, and instituting
curfews and travel restrictions. Major changes in government include changes or depositions
of the prime minister, the ruling party, the dissolution of parliament, and the 2001
Narayanhiti Palace killings. ‘Strikes and protests’ refer to any such event that involved at
least several hundred people, took place nationwide, in Kathmandu and/or other urban areas,
and was reported in national Nepali and English language newspapers and over FM radio
broadcasts. All of these events were widely publicized to the general population and
threatened the basic stability of the government, creating a sense of a vacuum of power
when it was not clear who was or would be in control of the country. In addition to bomb
blasts, Figure 1 also shows the number of political events that occurred in each month of the
study period. Besides one long state of emergency in 2001 and 2002, political events
occurred sporadically throughout.
4.2 Analytic Strategy
We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models to predict the effects of bomb
blasts, political events, and duration on individual response, refusal, and non-contact rates.
Because household response rates remain very high and there is little variance, we are not
able to model this outcome. Thus our regression models test the effects of these time-
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varying events on individual response rates, individual refusal rates, and individual non-
contact rates. We lag all conflict-related measures by one month in order to assure that the
results we are measuring occurred chronologically after the event. For example, the models
test the effect of a bomb blast in April on response rates in May. Thus this is an examination
of the immediate effects of conflict events on response rates.
Effectively, these are models of time. The units of analysis in this study are months. The
outcomes of interest are response rates and the independent variables are the numbers of
conflict events per month. These are all characteristics of months, not characteristics of
people.
4.3 Results
Response rates of individuals and households remained very high throughout the ten-and-a-
half years that we examine, from February 1997 through July 2007. As shown in Figure 1
with the solid line, household response rates slowly decreased from 100% in February 1997
to a low of 98.41% in July 2007. Individual response rates also remained high, but with
more variance. Individual response rates, shown with a dashed line, started at a high of
100% in July 1997, progressively decreased until about mid-2003. Around October of 2003,
individual response rates experienced an even steeper and sustained decrease until the end of
the year. Then we find slightly increased response rates until the beginning of 2005 where
another period of sustained decrease continued through July 2007, ending in a low of
92.51%. In Figure 1 we present these response rates laid over bomb blasts and political
events to provide an opportunity for initial visual analysis of possible relationships between
events and response rates. As you can see, the steepest sustained decrease in individual
response rates occurs just after the first major increase in bombings in mid-2003. This could
suggest a relationship between bombing and response rates and indicates the need for further
statistical analysis.
One reason that the household response rates remained much higher than individual
response rates throughout this period is that we allowed both multiple informants and
change over time in informants for the household survey. Thus if an individual in the
household migrated away or refused to participate, another household member could
participate on behalf of the household. In consequence of this consistently high household
response rate, disaggregating it into refusals and non-contacts and examining the impacts of
specific events is not possible.
Disaggregating individual response rates into non-contact and refusal rates provides more
information. These are shown in Figure 2 with the solid and dashed lines on the left-hand y-
axis. Again, these are overlaid on the event data, which relate to the right-hand y-axis.
Refusal rates remained low and progressively stable, increasing to a high of just 1.14%.
Non-contact rates were more variable and reached a much higher peak of 6.34% in July
2007. Notably, the individual non-contact rate produces a solid line that is almost exactly
symmetrical to the dashed line for the individual response rate in Figure 1, indicating that
much of the variance in response rates was driven by non-contacts. Again, the steepest
sustained increase in the non-contact rate appears at similar points in time as increases in
bombings, around October 2003.
We now turn to results of regressions, using conflict events and duration to predict
individual response rates. Model 1 of Table 1 shows the effect of duration since the study
started on response rates. The coefficient for years since study started is -0.65 and
statistically significant, indicating that for each additional year, the response rate decreased
by about 0.65%. The adjusted R2 is about 0.9480, indicating that about 95% of the variance
Axinn et al. Page 9













in individual response rates is predicted by duration alone. The effect of duration remains
consistently strong throughout Models 2-4.
Model 2 shows the effects of bomb blasts on response rates, independent of duration since
the study started. The coefficient for bomb blasts is small and it is not statistically
significant. Thus, we fail to find evidence that bomb blasts had a significant effect on
response rates.
The effect of political events on response rates, which is shown in Model 3, was positive,
meaning that political events increased response rates. In other words, independent of
duration, in any month after a large and destabilizing political event occurred, we find a
0.25% higher response rate. We find similar effects in Model 4, which includes all three
measures for bomb blasts, political events, and duration. Note that although political events
produce statistically significant effects on response rates, the coefficient is less than half the
size of the duration coefficient. This suggests that while political events are important, the
effect of one political event on response rates was much smaller than the effect of one year
duration since the study started. In other words, we find that duration produced the strongest
effect on response rates during this conflict.
Table 2 shows the results of regression models predicting refusal rates. Note that the
meaning of the coefficients for refusal rates is opposite of those for response rates. When
refusal rates go up, response rates go down. Similarly, a positive effect on refusal rates
would be a negative effect on response rates. As shown in Model 5, duration had a small,
positive, and statistically significant effect on refusals. This means that for each year of the
study, refusals increased by about 0.09%. While the effect is small, this is primarily because
there was little change in refusal rates throughout the study. Even with a small coefficient,
the adjusted R2 in Model 5 is 0.9599, meaning that about 96% of variation in refusals is a
result of duration since the study started.
Bomb blasts and political events had even smaller effects on refusal rates. The coefficient
for bomb blasts in Model 6 and Model 8 (where political events are controlled) is 0.01,
meaning that in a month after one bomb blast the refusal rate went up by 0.01%. The
coefficient for political events is negative in Model 7 and in Model 8 (where bomb blasts is
controlled). At -0.02, the effect of political events is similarly small, influencing a decrease
in refusals of 0.02%. In other words, fewer people refused to take the survey after political
events. The effect of bomb blasts on refusal rates supports our hypothesis that events in the
local area would increase anxiety and make people less willing to participate in the survey.
The negative effect of political events however is opposite of this prediction. This indicates
that there could be an important difference between events in the local area and events that
are concentrated in the capital. Further detailed research that includes qualitative interviews
will be necessary to provide a better understanding of this difference. However, the key
finding from this analysis of refusals is that bomb blasts and political events made very little
difference in refusals and the largest influence we find was duration.
We now turn to the results predicting the non-contact rates, shown in Table 3. Duration had
a positive effect throughout all models. As shown in Model 9 that includes only duration, the
coefficient is 0.55, meaning that for each additional year of the survey, non-contact rates
increased by about 0.55%. As with refusals and the overall individual response rates, the
adjusted R2 in this model is high at 0.9361. This means that duration alone accounts for
about 94% of variance in non-contact rates. Bomb blasts did not have a significant influence
on non-contact rates in Model 10 or in Model 12 that included all measures. Political events
had a negative effect, with a coefficient of -0.24 in Model 11. This indicates that
independent of duration and bomb blasts, in a month after one political event, the non-
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contact rate decreased by 0.24%. In other words, political events made it easier to contact
people. This result is consistent in Model 12 when bomb blasts are also controlled. Thus we
find similar results for non-contacts as we do for individual response rates; duration
increased non-contacts and political events decreased non-contacts. Again, while the effect
of political events is notable and statistically significant, it was much smaller than (less than
half) the effect of duration measured in years.
In summary, we find that bomb blasts, political events, and duration all had significant
effects on different aspects of response in the CVFS between 1997 and 2007. Bomb blasts
affected only refusal rates and the effect was so small as to be almost negligible. Political
events had positive effects, increasing response rates, slightly decreasing refusals, and
decreasing non-contacts. These results provide evidence to support the hypothesis that
migration during armed conflict might actually decrease in response to political events
centered in the capital Kathmandu that cause instability and decreased migration can result
in higher response rates and lower non-contact rates in Chitwan.
However, as shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3, these results clearly demonstrate that the largest
effect on response rates, refusals, and non-contacts during this period was duration. In other
words, the normal longitudinal attrition over time had the largest effect on each outcome and
improved model fit (adjusted R2) to the largest extent. For example, in Model 4 which
predicts response rates, each progressive year decreased response rates by about 0.65%.
Bomb blasts had no effect and political events increased response rates by about 0.26%.
Thus, during this period, attrition had the largest effect on response rates, as we would
expect to find in any survey, during or not during an armed conflict. When both political
events and bomb blasts are taken into account, evidence indicates that the conflict actually
improved response rates (through political events) more than it decreased them (through
bomb blasts).
5. Strategies for Maximizing Survey Data Quality and Safety during Conflict
Clearly, the procedures used in the Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS) panel data
collection helped to mitigate the potential consequences of violent events on response rates.
Next, we review the operational strategies used in the CVFS to reduce the consequences of
armed conflict on the survey data collection and protect interviewer and respondent safety at
the same time. By considering steps taken to improve the survey operation during this period
of conflict, we illustrate key operational strategies that can be used to maximize survey
coverage and data quality during armed conflict in other areas as well. These strategies
include absolute political neutrality of the research organization and staff, direct interaction
with political leaders on all sides of the conflict, highly transparent procedures for the
protection of human subjects from disclosure risks, and tailoring of contact procedures and
protocols to changing respondent circumstances. We describe the CVFS operational
procedures linked to each of these strategies in that order below.
5.1 Absolute political neutrality of the research organization and staff
The CVFS in Nepal is conducted by a local organization, the Institute for Social and
Environmental Research Nepal (ISER-N), which follows a strict practice of political
neutrality. At the organizational level, this means that the ISER-N never supports any
specific political parties or leader and never uses its research, educational, or outreach
activities in favor of any one politician or political entity. It also means that the ISER-N does
not have any institutional relationships with other non-governmental organizations which
could be perceived to have specific political agendas. At the individual level, this means that
the staff of the ISER-N, including interviewers, is not allowed to become leaders or activists
in any specific political party or political cause. This stringent policy of absolute political
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neutrality proved essential in maintaining respondent cooperation as well as permission to
continue operating during the period of conflict when governments were changing rapidly
and sometimes informally. Moreover, ISER-N had followed this practice of political
neutrality for many years before the conflict began. This long-term commitment to political
neutrality helped to establish a reputation of political independence for ISER-N. As violence
increased and political factions became stronger, government security became weaker, and
local people's trust in either of the conflicting parties deteriorated. The commitment of ISER
–N to political neutrality became a fundamental building block for maintaining high levels
of respondent trust and cooperation throughout the violent period.
5.2 Direct interaction with political leaders on all sides of the conflict
As conflict began, staff of the ISER-N began systematically engaging in meetings with
political leaders on all sides of the conflict. The meetings included both visits to these
leaders and invitations for the leaders of the conflicting parties to visit the offices of the
ISER-N to inspect them. First, these meetings were used to explain the scientific and
educational objectives of the research conducted for the CVFS. Second, they were also used
to explain to leaders on all sides of the conflict that the research was low risk to all of those
engaged in the conflict. Third, this direct regular contact with leaders on all sides of the
conflict was used to assure that both the study and the data collection organization could
quickly respond to changing circumstances and demands of the conflict.
5.3 Transparent procedures for the protection of human subjects from disclosure risks
The transparency of human subjects protection protocols during the conflict became as
important in the CVFS as the protocols themselves. The CVFS always followed standard
protocols for the protection of human subjects from research risks, including disclosure
risks. These include: a) no use of names, addresses, or other identifying information on any
questionnaire materials that had respondent answers to questions, b) use of ID numbers on
all respondent materials, c) control of content to avoid sensitive topics, especially topics that
might be sensitive during the conflict (such as political party membership), d) computerized
data entry including only ID numbers and no other identifying information, and e) secure
(locked and guarded) physical separation of all study materials that did contain identifying
information, such as cover sheets and control files. These routine practices always provide
important safeguards against the disclosure of respondent identities, but were especially
important during the period of conflict. Most important, these ongoing human subjects
protection protocols were made transparent to both respondents and political leaders during
the time of conflict.
5.4 Tailoring of contact procedures to changing respondent circumstances
Tailoring respondent contact procedures is a known and valuable approach to maintaining
high response rates no matter what the circumstances (Groves and Couper 1998). In times of
conflict this tailoring must address specific aspects of the conflict itself, as well as individual
respondent and interviewer needs.
During the conflict period, CVFS respondent contact procedures were altered in several
specific ways to tailor them more appropriately to the conflict circumstances. First, CVFS
staff stopped writing names on contact materials and instead kept names of individual
respondents in strictly confidential control files and call records. Second, interviewer calling
times were altered to eliminate any calling outside of daylight hours. This was done to
reduce suspicion of both the interviewers and the respondents they visited. Third, during
periods of peak violence the monthly registry data collection was switched from one visit a
month with monthly reporting to one visit every three months with retrospective monthly
reporting across those three months. Fourth, respondent tracking procedures were changed
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to include institutionalized populations, including both those in the military and those in
prison. Fifth, during periods of peak violence, CVFS interviewers stopped conducting
follow-up interviews and tracking efforts in specific geographic locations. Although this
procedure created some temporary dips in response rates, it built confidence in the
interviewing staff and rapport among the respondents who could be assured that study
managers were concerned for their safety and would actively avoid data collection in violent
locations.
6. Conclusion
The continuation of the Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS) panel data collection
throughout the period of the recent armed conflict in Nepal provides a relatively rare
window into the dynamics of survey data collection operations through a period of intense
armed conflict. This window serves both to teach us about the consequences of violent
events for survey data collection and to illustrate key strategies in forming a survey
operations response to circumstances of violent conflict. Though the CVFS was collecting
data before the conflict in Nepal began, insights from this investigation provide an important
source of information for those who seek to begin survey data collection in the context of an
ongoing conflict.
In the domain of consequences of violent events for survey data collection, we use this case
to demonstrate how specific violent events influence survey data quality. Faced with violent
conflict in the study population, many surveys may simply cease operations and close data
collection based on the assumption that quality data cannot be collected. Because the CVFS
continued to collect data throughout the conflict in Nepal, we were able to analyze the links
between changes over time in the frequency of violent and political events and changes over
time in response rates. Non-response is only one dimension of total survey error (Groves et
al. 2004) and the biases produced by non-response vary across items within a survey
(Groves 2006; Groves and Peytcheva 2008). However, high response rates are a product of
high effort (Groves and Couper 1998) and high effort improves survey quality (Groves
1989), so we treat response rates as some empirical insight into overall survey quality.
The analyses we present here demonstrate that with operational effort to address the violent
conflict conditions, violent events themselves can be kept to a relatively modest influence on
participation in the survey. As with most longitudinal surveys, duration of the CVFS was by
far the greatest driver of response rates (Groves and Couper 1998). However, our results are
also consistent with the conclusion that different dimensions of armed conflict can affect
survey data quality in opposing directions, with higher numbers of bombings in the local
area slightly increasing refusal rates but higher numbers of nationwide political events
actually increasing response rates through decreasing both refusals and non-contacts. This
important finding not only demonstrates that survey data quality may be affected differently
by various dimensions of armed conflict, it also shows that some dimensions of armed
conflict may actually increase response rates. Perhaps most important is the general result
that response rates for both the household survey and the individual survey remained
exceptionally high throughout the conflict period. This contradicts common assumptions
about the infeasibility of collecting survey data during conflict and indicates that high
quality data can indeed be collected during periods of generalized violence and instability.
In the domain of illustrating key principles in forming a survey operations response to
circumstances of armed conflict, the procedures used in the CVFS panel study clearly
helped to mitigate the potential consequences of those violent events on response rates. In
fact, our analyses reveal that the natural decay over time in response rates likely in any panel
study is a much stronger explanation of the month-to-month variation in CVFS response
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rates than the conflict events themselves. The operational strategies used in the CVFS to
reduce the consequences of violent conflict virtually eliminated the potential negative
influence of these events on response rates. The principles illustrated by those operational
strategies include absolute political neutrality of the research staff, direct interaction with
political leaders on all sides of the conflict, highly transparent procedures for the protection
of human subjects from disclosure risks, and tailoring of contact procedures and protocols to
changing respondent circumstances. We argue that these key operational principles can be
used to maximize survey coverage and data quality during armed conflict in other settings
too.
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Number of bomb blasts, political events, and household and individual response rates in the
Chitwan Valley Family Study
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Number of Bomb blasts, political events, and individual non-contact and refusal rates in the
Chitwan Valley Family Study.
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Table 1
OLS regression models, predicting individual response rates during armed conflict in the Chitwan Valley
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Local Events
    Bomb blasts per month (SATP) (0-12) - 0.01 (0.35) - 0.01 (0.62)
Nationwide Events







    Year since study started (0-10)
- 0.65
***
 (47.75) - 0.65
***
 (45.21) - 0.66
***
 (49.22) - 0.65
***
 (46.87)
R2 0.9484 0.9485 0.9525 0.9527
Adjusted R2 0.9480 0.9476 0.9518 0.9515
No. of Observations (months): 126 126 126 126
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Table 2
OLS regression models, predicting individual refusal rates during armed conflict in the Chitwan Valley
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Local Events






















R2 0.9599 0.9663 0.9605 0.9673
Adjusted R2 0.9595 0.9657 0.9599 0.9665
No. of Observations (months): 126 126 126 126
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Table 3
OLS regression models, predicting individual non-contact rates during armed conflict in the Chitwan Valley
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Local Events
    Bomb blasts per month (SATP) (0-12) - 0.004 (0.18) 0.001 (0.07)
Nationwide Events
    Political event index (0-4)
- 0.24
***














R2 0.9361 0.9361 0.9410 0.9410
Adjusted R2 0.9356 0.9351 0.9401 0.9396
No. of Observations (months): 126 126 126 126





p < .001 (one-tailed tests)
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